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ABSTRACT 
 
Structural changes in the European natural gas market such as liberalization, increasing domestic 
demand, and increasing import dependency have triggered new attempts to model these markets 
accurately. In this paper, we propose an exhaustive model of the European natural gas supply 
including the possibility of strategic behaviour of the agents along the value-added chain. We 
structure it as a two-stage-game with natural gas exports to Europe (first stage) and wholesale 
trade within Europe (second stage).  The case of non-cooperative Cournot competition at both 
stages proves to be the most realistic scenario. The results of the perfect competition and cartel 
scenario are also presented. Our results suggest that the main suppliers of natural gas to Europe 
(Russia, Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway) remain dominant, but that they are complemented by 
overseas supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The model also enables us to identify transport 
infrastructure bottlenecks where transport capacity constraints are binding.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
he European gas market has a number of a various aspects: from the definition of the most suitable 
economic behaviour to the market liberalization which aims to boost competition at the level of each 
member state as well as within the European Union (EU), to the decrease in the dependency on 
certain non-EU suppliers, which should increase the competition among the non-EU exporters. Therefore, observing 
the strategic behaviour of the market players (e.g. related to net access, cooperation or refusal to collaborate, etc.) 
becomes crucial. 
 
There are different mathematical models for describing the behaviour of a competitive market. For the 
scope of this paper, the EU natural gas market is modelled using a game theoretic model. The authors compare the 
strategic behaviour of the market players reflected by their market influences based on the Nash equilibrium theory 
among an environment of perfect competition.  
 
In the case of perfect competition, each agent acts as a price taker, equalizing prices and marginal costs in 
order to optimise profit. The paper further considers the Cournot model, at the Nash equilibrium, where electricity 
firms aim to maximize their profit and enlarge their market shares taking into consideration various relationships 
between the real market elasticity values and assumptions about the behaviour of other players. The results of the 
cartel model are also presented. 
 
The model follows a number of other modelling attempts of the European gas sector. The structure of the 
sector suggests modelling the market with oligopolistic competition in a game theoretic framework. Most models 
actually distinguish the upstream market among producers (gas extraction/production taking place mostly outside 
Europe) and the downstream trader market (i.e. the wholesale market inside Europe).  
 
Golombek et al. (1995) were the first of the recent literature to study the effects of liberalizing the natural 
gas market in Western Europe. They distinguish between upstream (producers) and downstream (traders) agents on 
the gas market. Here, liberalization of the European gas market is defined as the situation where downstream traders 
can exploit arbitrage possibilities between countries as well as between market segments (industry, and local 
distribution companies for households). Their numerical model yields that liberalization increases upstream 
T 
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competition. In an extension of this model, Golombek et al. (1998) study the supply side and the optimal number of 
producers. They assume a liberalized demand side, that is producers sell directly to end-consumers in an integrated. 
 
The EUGAS model (Perner and Seeliger (2004)) analyses the long-term gas supply to Europe. It is a model 
of linear optimization of European gas supply taking into account production and transport capacities, but treating 
gas demand exogenously. The most interesting feature of the model is the explicit recognition of infrastructure 
capacities (pipelines and LNG terminals) The EUGAS model has recently been extended by introducing global gas 
reserves, without however modifying the linear optimization structure (Düweke and Hamacher (2005)).  
 
The GASTALE model (Boots et al. (2004)) is the first model to use the structure of successive oligopoly in 
gas production and trading. This model is similar to ours in that its underlying structure is a two-stage game.  
 
Hirschhausen et al. (2005) consider the options for Russia to transport its gas to Western Europe. Here, the 
players Russia and Ukraine could either play a cooperative or a non-cooperative game. The analytical results as well 
as numerical simulation results show that the construction of pipelines through Belarus results in higher profits for 
Russia while Ukraine loses. 
 
Given the growing scope of the European natural gas market, and the need for a policy relevant analysis, 
the scope of the existing models with regard to demand and supply structures, and in particular the infrastructure 
component, remains unsatisfying. The model developed in this paper, aims at combining a realistic representation of 
the market structure with a dynamic infrastructure analysis. Moreover we improve the data and use more detailed 
data than in previous models of the European gas sector. The remainder of the paper is structured as followed. In 
Section 2, we will outline the structure of the European gas market, with an emphasis on the natural gas trade. In 
Section 3, we will give a detailed description of the model and the used data. The subsequent presentation in Section 
4 of the main simulation results will be followed by the conclusions (Section 5).  
 
2.  STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN GAS SECTOR  
 
We have stated that the European gas market currently faces three main challenges. There are changes 
ongoing on the demand side as well as on the supply side and the speed of reforms is accelerating. These changes do 
not only have an impact on the natural gas market within Europe but also on the supply relations of Europe with 
other gas producing countries. Hence, the gas sector has been identified as a strategic sector by the European 
Commission (European Commission (2001))
 
and by the International Energy Agency (IEA).  
 
First, European demand of natural gas is highly likely to increase further over the next decades. The share 
of natural gas in total primary energy demand in the European Union (EU-25) is expected to increase from 23% at 
present to a projected 32% in 2020. There will also be an increase in the absolute level of gas consumption from 
approximately 390 Mtoe per year today to a projected 565 Mtoe per year in 2020 (IEA (2004d)). The demand 
increase will mainly be driven by an increasing utilization for power generation.  
 
Second, since Europe can only partly satisfy its gas demand with indigenous production,  rising demand 
also means an increasing import dependency. Indigenous production in Europe is concentrated in the UK, the 
Netherlands and Norway. However, production in these countries will at best remain at the current level but will 
probably decrease because the fields in the North Sea are running out of gas. So, in different scenarios, the gas 
import dependency of the EU-25 is estimated by the International Energy Agency to increase from the current 49% 
(233 bcm in 2002) to over 80% (639 bcm) in 2020.  
 
At present, it is unclear where the additional gas will come from. Russia currently is the most important gas 
supplying country to the European Union and is expected to expand this role with a market share usually projected 
to increase from the current 40% of EU imports to two-thirds. Additional gas supplies will also have to come from 
new areas such as the Middle East, where Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is a form of supply of growing importance.  
 
Third, the European Commission has pushed for a progressive liberalization of the European natural gas 
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sector, a process which is still ongoing. Liberalization of the EU wholesale market and of gas distribution has led to 
a partial abandon of long-term contracts in the supply relationships. Previous liberalization experiences in the US 
and the UK have shown that the share of long-term contracts diminishes, although it always remains (well) above 
50%. So, LNG but also pipeline transported gas from "new" suppliers (Middle East etc.) could be beneficiaries of 
market liberalization in the EU. Traders in the EU are thus enabled to diversify their sources of supply.  
  
3.  MODEL DESCRIPTION AND DATA  
 
3.1  Model  
 
In this paper we examine the case when, at the starting and the finishing stages of the game, natural gas  
suppliers realize a  Cournot-Nash equilibrium with their profits maximized. Profits are calculated upon marginal 
production costs and price dependent demand, the latter relationship being represented by an inverse demand 
function, which is twice continuously differentiable.  
 
As a comparison we also include the perfect market scenario, where all the market agents act simply as 
price takers, and also the cartel situation for the natural gas exporters to Europe (we do not consider the cartel among 
the intra-European traders).  
 
At the intermediate stage of the game, firms maximize their profits given the strategic behavior of the other 
agents. Profits are computed on the base of variable production costs, maximum net power, net access costs and 
transportation costs. Market shares which may change with merges or cooperation also play an important role. In the 
oligopolistic market structure, prices can be dependent upon the market shares and market powers. Prices are also 
influenced by the price elasticity of demand, and it is exactly there that the influence coefficients arise.  
 
In a situation of perfect competition, that is not the case. When solving optimization problems it is often 
useful to remember that each such a problem can be reduced to a complementarity problem. Generally speaking, in 
the complementarity framework, either a nonnegative variable is zero, or the corresponding inequality constraint is 
active, i.e. it is in fact an equality. Primarily, by solving a mixed complementarity problem (MCP), the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker  (KKT) optimality conditions are determined and solved for a decision variable. The MCP format and 
the KKT conditions are equivalent. Therefore, each MCP can be transformed to the classical optimality conditions 
and vice versa. The idea behind the MCP formulation is to develop a program that permits the classical 
decomposition method to be obsolete, instead ascertaining the MCP conditions directly. The main advantages of 
MCP are: (1) the simultaneous and parallel determination of decision variables and side constraints, and (2) the 
solution of complex mathematical programs without an explicit formulation of the objective function. Specially 
developed solvers detect the MCP format directly and point out, if necessary, if side constraints are defined 
incorrectly. Present day computer technologies allow an uncomplicated and fast solution of MCPs by mathematical 
algorithms. At this moment, for instance, GAMS provides MILES and PATH as major solvers. In addition, applying 
the MCP method one avoids the intricacy of finding a solution by a standard nonlinear programming (NLP) solver 
when the starting values are distant from the optimum point. Transforming an optimization problem into a MCP 
formulation requires a specification of the first order optimality conditions taking into account all the upper and 
lower bounds of the decision variables.  
 
Notation: 
 
FP - collection of firms-providers 
FD - collection of firms-distributors 
R - list of  European importing countries 
I - set of sources (domestic (d) or import (i)) 
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Parameters 
 
c(i,r) - unit production cost   
de0(r) - reference demand for gas in region r 
pe0(r) - reference price of gas in region r 
σr  - regional price elasticity 
 
Variables 
 
s(f,r) - supply by firm f to region r,  
                                pe(r) - provider’s price of gas in region r 
pe2(r) - distributor’s price of gas in region r 
 
We assume the (long-run) demand elasticity values to be rather low (-0.8 for Western Europe, -0.7 for the 
Eastern Europe), which reflects certain inelasticity of the natural gas demand: shifting from gas to another fuel 
would require changes in the technical installations which are costly and time consuming.  
 
Each player is restricted by capacity limitations such as transport infrastructure constraints (export, import 
capacities in terms of pipelines and LNG terminals), production capacities. On the first stage of exports to Europe, 
gas trade is restricted by the export infrastructure of each producer and the import capacity of each wholesale trader. 
On the second stage, the supply by each trader is restricted by his domestic production capacity as well as by his 
earlier import capacity; his re-sales are limited to the capacity of the pipeline grid between him and each end-user 
market.  
 
On both stages, each player maximizes his profit under certain capacities constrains: 
 
 Stage 1: 
 
Each exporter maximizes its profit, given its unit costs of production and transport to the  particular country 
r, its total export/transport capacity, the import capacity of the customer, the reference demand (de0) and price 
elasticity ( ) in each importing country. 
 
    
      
which is subject to infrastructure capacities constraints and the market clearing constraints: 
 
 
                                                      
 
 Stage 2: 
 
Each European gas trading company maximizes its profit, analogously to as in the previous stage, given its 
unit production costs ( composed of costs of  importing and costs of indigenous production), transport capacities, the 
reference demand (de0) and price elasticity ( ) in each importing country. 
 
 
 
which is subject to inner-European capacities constraints and market clearing condition inside of Europe: 
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where   
 
 
with                                                denoting the domestic and imported supply, respectively,  by  firm f. 
 
In the framework of the model, we check for the total balancing: 
 
The profit maximization problem of each individual player (producer or trader) is solved as a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP) which is programmed in GAMS. The MCP format is non-linear optimization 
program that simultaneously takes into account all side constrains, which in our model are the production and 
capacity constraints. 
 
3.2  Data  
 
We aim at having an exhaustive representation of all relevant players on the European natural gas market. 
In Table 1, we summarize the included exporting and importing regions. We include Egypt, Iraq and Venezuela and 
aggregated supplier “Others” although they have no gas export capacity to Europe, in order to balance the European 
natural gas market with the global gas market. The aggregated market importer is presented as “rest of the world” 
having the same proposal. We assume that there is one gas company per country or region, which is justified by the 
existence of national (quasi-) monopolies in reality, such as GdF in France, Gasprom in Russia, etc.  
 
 
Exporting Regions           Importing Regions  
Algeria  United Kingdom  
Libya  Netherlands  
Egypt  Spain / Portugal  
Iraq  France  
Iran  Italy / Switzerland  
Middle East (Qatar, UAE, Oman)  Belgium / Luxemburg  
Former Soviet Union  Germany  
Norway  Denmark  
Netherlands  Sweden / Finland  
United Kingdom  Austria  
Nigeria  Poland  
Trinidad  
Czech Rep. / Slovak Rep. / 
Hungary  
Venezuela  Former Yugoslavia / Albania  
 Others Romania / Bulgaria  
  
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania)  
  Greece  
  
Turkey  
   RoW (rest of the world) 
 
Table 1:  Regions in the model 
 
 
We use the data for the base year 2003. Data on reference trade flows and prices come from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA 2004a, 2004b) and from BP (2004). Data on production capacity in the European 
regions is from IEA (2004b). Transport capacity data mainly come from GTE the European organization of the 
national TSOs (transmission system operators) for intra-European capacities, and from OME (2001) for exporter 
capacities.  
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We use this data not only for availability reasons but also because the equilibrium results have to be 
situated in a long-run perspective.  
 
The cost data is a crucial input to the model with an important influence on the results. In the OME (2001) 
data, LNG is still a high-cost supplier with costs of around 3 US-$ per Mbtu for typical LNG exporters as Nigeria, 
Venezuela and the Middle East.  
 
Norway is a producer at fairly high costs, whereas Algeria and to a less extent Russia can export at 
relatively low costs to Europe (OME (2001), pp. 18). Political and other “soft” considerations (e.g. the reliability of 
an exporter) do not enter the cost data and consequently not the model. The same is true for reserves which do not 
enter in the production capacity of the producers.  
 
4.  SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
The model is run for three different scenarios. They are: the perfect competition, Cournot-Nash scenario 
and the cartel for Stage 1 market agents.   
 
4.1  First Stage: Exports To Europe  
 
The distribution of profits (Table 2) clearly shows that not only the profits are higher in the oligopolistic 
scenario, as expected, but there are also more players earning profits. The cartel scenario only enhances those 
effects, but has a devastation impact on the domestic European prices, as will be shown in the next session. 
 
 
Exporters Algeria Libya Egypt Iraq Iran Middle East FSU 
Competition 2,829 0,094   0,211 0,001 6,939 
Cournot 3,420 0,167   0,389 0,494 7,346 
Cartel 3,980 0,211   0,415 0,615 8,694 
Exporters Norway Holland UK Nigeria Trinidad   
Competition 1,289 0,498 0,794 0,0 0,0   
Cournot 1,587 0,697 1,111 0,216 0,12   
Cartel 1,794 0,897 1,254 0,3 0,15   
 
Table 2:  Profits of the exporters to the EU in the Perfect Competition and Cournot scenarios in billion USD. 
 
 
4.2  Second Stage: Intra-European Trade  
 
The second stage of the model performs the re-sales of the imported gas by wholesale traders, together with 
domestically produced natural gas. Under our assumption of liberalized access to the transportation networks and 
distribution in Europe, there is indeed a vital wholesale trade between European countries, with e.g. Germany 
exporting 7.2 bcm / year to France, or France exporting 7.1 bcm/ year to Italy/Switzerland. Thus, although the 
players on the market are behaving strategically, free market access can assure international trade.  
 
But many wholesale trade flows are subject to binding infrastructure reflecting that at present there are only 
limited infrastructure capacities between European countries. Especially the border between Spain and France, and 
the connection to the United Kingdom are transport bottlenecks. The same is true for many Eastern European 
regions (Romania/Bulgaria, the Baltic States, also Greece) which have no or only limited access to the European 
wholesale market. This can be an explanation why these regions have higher prices.  
 
4.3  Prices On The Upstream And Downstream Market  
 
As it can be easily seen, the classical Nash equilibrium can be taken as the most plausible intermediate 
model between the perfect competition scenario and the situation, when the exporters form the gas-cartel (like the 
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OPEC). Even though, the difference between the perfect competition and the oligopolistic markets shows not to be 
too remarkable due to the large number of natural gas exporters to the Europe, as well as the large number of inter-
European market agents, which seems to ensure an acceptable level of competition. The cartel scenario, in contrary, 
leads to up to 1.5 times increment of the domestic prices for the European customers.  
 
 
Markets  2nd stage: European market  
  Competition Cournot Cartel 
UK  114,18 133,05  189,21  
Netherlands  111,44  134,00  189,14 
Spain/Portugal  123,15 136,12  189,34 
France  116,08 134,36  189,19  
Italy/Switzerland  119,55 134,27  189,25 
Belgium/Lux  117,28 134,89  189,11 
Germany  117,11 132,21  189,00  
Denmark  118,15 
 
133,77  189,03 
Sweden/Finland  119,89 134,09  191,34 
Austria  118,24 135,26  189,01 
Poland  121,88 134,59 188,34 
Czech/Slovak Rep./Hungary  122,10 133,713  189,28  
Balkan  124,08 135,29  190,17  
Romania/Bulgaria  125,11 135,33  189,99 
Baltic  124,87  135,11  189,56 
Greece  119,43 133,82  189,02 
Turkey  122,64  134,37  189,46  
 
 
Table3:  Simulation results: prices in USD per thousand cubic meters. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK  
 
We have presented a quasi-static model of the European natural gas market. We focus on the modelling of 
the situation of double marginalization that can actually be observed in reality. Exporters to Europe as well as 
wholesale trading firms in Europe are a small number and behave strategically. Hence, our model can be of 
particular interest to policy advice because it explains a situation of imperfect competition in a liberalized natural 
gas market. We explicitly take into account infrastructure capacities which may be binding, while solving a non-
linear optimization.  
 
Our results suggest that the main suppliers of natural gas to Europe (Russia, Algeria, the Netherlands, 
Norway) remain dominant, but that they will be complemented by overseas supplies of LNG. The higher price in 
Cournot competition allows market entry of higher cost exporters (mostly LNG producers from the Middle East, 
Nigeria and the Caribbean) while total gas demand in Europe is lower, thereby crowding out some traditional 
supplies. We identify infrastructure bottlenecks for a number of low cost producers such as Algeria, the Netherlands, 
the UK. However, we are aware that this result depends crucially on the cost data that enters the model.  
 
Consequently, there are several improvements which should be included in the model. Cost data needs to 
be more reliable, especially for LNG, and one usage of a cost function instead of point cost data should be 
considered. In addition, temporal distortions which might enter the model by using data for one single base year 
(2003) could be removed. Also, capacity and transport cost data needs improvement since some data points rely on 
our own assumptions. The same holds for demand elasticity values. 
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